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I show that if mental states are function of physical states, then they are nonlocal. Therefore, if
mental states are reducible to brain physics, Classical Physics is not enough. I show, using a thought
experiment, that the computationalist thesis requires nonlocality too. Quantum Mechanics allows
this kind of nonlocality, but we will need to see if it explains it. The proof of nonlocality is straight-
forward and general, and takes the first two pages of the article, but the result is counterintuitive,
so I spend a large part of the article discussing possible objections, alternatives, and implications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern Science can be seen as the quest to reduce
all natural phenomena to explanations based on micro-
physics. This position emerged because progress in Sci-
ence often coincided with new reductionist explanations.
By inductive and reductionist arguments one expects
that all mental processes will eventually be reduced to
microphysics [14, 16, 18, 30, 42], leading to the following
Claim 1 (of reductionism). Self-reported mental pro-
cesses reduce to and are determined by brain physics.
Logical, but also informal thinking, can be modeled
computationally, as information processing, neural net-
work processing, machine learning etc. Therefore, many
researchers [42, 44, 53, 56] think the following to be true:
Claim 2 (of classicality). Mental processes reduce to
Classical Physics.
In this article I will show that there is a contradiction
between Claim 1 and Claim 2.
Because any process is a succession of states, Claim
1 implies that mental states are properties of physical
states. This can be formalized as a Principle (Fig. 1):
Principle 1 (physical-mental correspondence). There is
a function Ψ which associates to (some of the) physical
states the corresponding mental states they determine,
mental state = Ψ (physical state) (1)
FIG. 1. Schematic representation of a network of neurons
whose state evolves in time, determining a succession of men-
tal states via the function Ψ from Principle 1.
To prove the contradiction between Claim 1 and Claim
2, I will show that if Principle 1 is correct, then mental
states have to be nonlocal. The steps of the reasoning are
Claim 1⇒ Principle 1⇒ nonlocality⇒ Claim 2 is false.
This nonlocality seems to conflict with relativistic lo-
cality, which grounds the very causality of physical pro-
cesses. Therefore, it is a problem that has to be addressed
by any physicalist program that aims to include the men-
tal processes. On the one hand, Ψ seems to be more than
the sum of its parts, if these parts are the local physical
quantities at each point in the relevant region of space.
This may seem as preventing the reductionism of mental
processes to physical ones. On the other hand, this non-
locality is strikingly similar to that of the wavefunction
from Quantum Mechanics (QM), so it may still be con-
sistent with physicalism. But this identification comes
with its own problems, as we will see.
The proof, given in Sec. §II, is independent of the
fundamental theory of the microphysical level. While it
is very simple, its implications may be counterintuitive,
so I describe a thought experiment that may bring more
intuition in Sec. §III. In Sec. §IV I argue that the best
option is Quantum Mechanics. In Section §V I try to
anticipate and address possible objections. In Sec. §VI
I explore possible alternative ways out, and in Sec. §VII
some implications of nonlocality.
II. THE PROOF
I will now formulate the central argument, in a theory-
independent manner. The proof is simple, but since the
result may be counterintuitive, the reader who finds it
confusing can read the thought experiment from Section
§III, which aims to make very intuitive why mental states
are nonlocal, and then return to this Section.
For theoretical-independence and generality, I rely only
on a common structure of most, if not all theories discov-
ered so far: the representation of processes as temporal
successions of physical states. This mathematical struc-
ture is called dynamical system, and it is common to clas-
sical and quantum, nonrelativistic and relativistic (even
General Relativity [4]), continuous and discrete and in
fact to all more or less successful theories conceived so
far by physicists.
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2Very generally, but not more formally than needed for
the argument, a dynamical system can be defined as
1. A state space S, which is the set of all possible
states of the system allowed by the theory.
2. A set H of subsets of S, called histories, so that for
each history h ∈ H there is a surjective function
t : T → h from a totally ordered set T to h.
The totally ordered set T represents the time1. Each
history represents a process, and specifies the state of the
system for each instant t ∈ T . The dynamical system can
be given by specifying an evolution law, a dynamical law,
but this is equivalent to specifying all possible histories2.
Even if we do not know the final theory that can de-
scribe completely all natural phenomena, we know that
Metaprinciple 1 (Dynamical system). The physical
world is described by a dynamical system.
An immediate consequence is that a system cannot
directly access other states in the state space. It cannot
directly access even its own previous states!
Observation 1 (Instantism). Any system can have di-
rect access only to its present state (Fig. 2).
FIG. 2. A physical system can access directly only its present
state. Consequently, a mental state can know the past only
indirectly, as records of the past physical states that exist in
the present physical state underlying that mental state.
At first sight, this is a very trivial observation. But
in fact its implications are too often overlooked. Even if
it is trivially true, the reader may object that, if we can
only access our present state, then how is it even possible
to remember the past? I will explain this known issue in
Sec. §V, Objection 7.
In classical theories, the dynamics is specified by par-
tial differential equations (PDE). The initial state fixes
the initial conditions of the PDE system, and the solu-
tion of the PDE system is a history of the states of the
1 In general, T also has group structure compatible with the order
relation, but we do not need it here.
2 In Newtonian Mechanics a state consists of the positions and
momenta of all particles, and the histories are given as a law by
Hamilton’s equations. In Standard QM, a state is represented
by a state vector from a Hilbert space. The histories are given
by Schro¨dinger’s equation, interrupted during measurements by
jumps whose probabilities are given by Born’s rule.
system at all times. The PDE are local, i.e. they involve
only quantities (and their partial derivatives of various
orders with respect to space and time) that depend on
position and time 3.
In a local theory, an event – which consists of its po-
sition and moment of time – can have direct access only
to itself. In relativistic theories, even indirect access is
limited to current records of the events from the past
lightcones of the current event, as shown in Fig. 2. Si-
multaneous events (with respect to a reference frame) are
isolated, “blind” to one another. This leads to
Observation 2 (Locality). In a local theory, any event
can have direct access only to the physical quantities lo-
cated at that event.
Fig. 3 illustrates Observation 2 and shows how the
events composing the present state of a brain are isolated
from one another in this sense.
FIG. 3. Illustration of Observation 2, which shows that in
a local theory any function of the entire configuration of the
present state can only be nonlocal.
Therefore, a function that depends on simultaneous
events at different places can only be nonlocal. In partic-
ular, function Ψ from Principle 1, which associates to a
physical state a mental state, is nonlocal. It follows that
we just proved the following
Theorem 1 (of nonlocality). Assuming Principle 1 and
Metaprinciple 1, mental states are nonlocal.
Since Classical Physics is local, from Theorem 1 follows
Corollary 1. Claim 1 and Claim 2 cannot be both true.
Proof. I will consider two cases.
Case I: Metaprinciple 1 is false for the brain physics.
This is unlikely, since there are no known theories that
contradict Metaprinciple 1, but let us assume it anyway.
Then, since Classical Physics require Metaprinciple 1 to
be true, it follows that Claim 2 is false.
Case II: Metaprinciple 1 is true. Since Claim 1 implies
Principle 1, we can apply Theorem 1, according to which
mental states are nonlocal. Hence, no classical theory
can support mental states, contradicting Claim 2.
Corollary 2. If only Quantum Mechanics is nonlocal,
then mental states require Quantum Mechanics.
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 1.
3 The dynamics of QM is also specified by PDE, and it is local, as
long as no quantum jumps take place [50].
3III. THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
The entire proof from Sec. §II is pretty straightfor-
ward. But if the conclusion of Theorem 1 is counterin-
tuitive, let us consider the argument again in a though
experiment, an intuition pump (cf. Dennett [17]) that
should make its essential points clearer. For this, I will
amplify the elements of the argument to a cosmic scale.
In §III A I discuss a thought experiment which shows
that, from the Claim 2+ that mental processes reduce to
classical computing, follows that they are nonlocal.
Claim 2+ (of classical computationalism). Mental pro-
cesses reduce to classical computing.
Claim 2+ is stronger than Claim 2, but it simplifies the
argument showing that mental states are nonlocal. An-
other reason to assume Claim 2+ is that it is supported
by various researchers [18, 23, 37, 41, 43, 44, 54, 56].
Then, in §III B, I propose and discuss a version of the
thought experiment which involves a biological brain, sat-
isfying the initial, more general Claim 2.
A. The cosmic computer thought experiment
Consider a hypothetical classical computer supporting
mental states. Let us spread its components throughout
our galaxy, or even across more galaxies, while taking the
necessary measures to still allow it to function. Identify
its smallest parts and separate the from one another, by
placing each one of them on a separate space station or-
biting a different star. Arrange that the space stations
storing these small parts exchange electromagnetic sig-
nals across the galaxy, to ensure the flow of information
necessary for the functioning of the computer.
It can be arranged, in principle, that our cosmic com-
puter is fragmented into very small parts, storing or pro-
cessing at most two bits each. There is no need for more
than two bits on each star, because any logical gate can
be made of two-bit gates, as explained in Reply 3.
If we assume that mental states can be reduced to com-
putation, then such a distributed computer should be
able to simulate a brain. A function Ψ as in Principle 1
should map the computer’s states to mental states.
The mental states of this cosmic mind change really
slowly, each bit requiring thousands or even millions of
years to be processed. But if we assume that a computer
can have mental states, then it should be possible for this
cosmic contraption to have mental states too.
We can even replace the bits with humans who wear
or not a hat, according to the bit’s state, and who pass
the hat from generation to generation to compensate for
the very slow-minded processing. We can obtain by this
cosmic versions of the Chinese nation argument [10, 15]
or of Searle’s Chinese room argument [46].
But, compared to these well-known arguments, there
is a plot twist here: the aim is to show that mental states
are nonlocal. And if this may not be so obvious when
we are talking about the brain, which appears to our
senses pretty much localized in space, this cosmic version
should make nonlocality evident even to the most skeptic
readers, because the bits supporting the mental states are
isolated and separated by spacelike intervals. But we will
see that its consequences are even more dramatic.
Several questions become natural at this point. Does
this cosmic mental process take place continuously, or
only when one of the bits flips its state? Are there mental
states associated to the thousands of years of stagnation
of the bits, time in which electromagnetic signals travel
across the universe from one star to another?
Regardless of the answer to these questions, the cor-
responding mental states are nevertheless nonlocal. Any
such state depends on bits located across very distant
stars, maybe galaxies apart, separated by spacelike in-
tervals. Let us make these problems more obvious.
Classical serial computers process one bit at a time (see
Reply 5). Even if we make the computer parallel, there
still is a central unit that breaks the task into smaller
tasks, and then centralizes the results, and it does so one
bit at a time. And since the flips of the bits happen at
discrete times, even if some of them are simultaneous,
Special and General Relativity allow us to pick a refer-
ence frame in which they are not simultaneous.
Problem 1. If the mental states are supported exclu-
sively when the bits are flipped, and if it can be arranged
that the computer processes one bit at a time, then how
is it possible for a bit to support complex mental states
like happiness or sadness?
But maybe the states of the other bits matter too, even
if they are not flipped right at that time. This indeed
avoids Problem 1, but raises other ones.
Problem 2. If the mental states are supported exclu-
sively by the states of the bits, then how does the mental
state “know” the configuration of the bits spread across
the galaxy, separated by spacelike intervals? And how
does it “know” what mental state to be from these appar-
ently disorganized zeroes and ones?
Problem 3. If there are other space stations contain-
ing bits that are not part of the same computer, then
how does the mental state of our computer discriminate
among them, to “know” which subset of these bits belong
to the computer that supports it?
One may hope that if we assume that not only the bit
configuration supports mental states, but also the signals
traveling on their way between different space stations,
this would help discriminate the bits from the same con-
figuration, and also help the mental state to “know” the
configuration. But Problems 2 and 3 remain, they only
extend to include the traveling signals.
On top of these problems, we have another one. There
is no rule that the bits are stored in a certain way on the
space stations. One can invent complicated contraptions
to store the bits in coins on a table, or in the position
4of any object on the space station, or in whatever states
any kind of object can have. Important is to have a way
to read and write the bits by analyzing and rearranging
these objects. How is then a mental state able to emerge
out of such a configuration camouflaged in such a way
in the state of the universe? If we insist on supporting
Claim 2+, there seem to be only a way out: accept that
all possible subsets of the configuration of the universe
support independent potential mental states!
Problem 4. Do all possible subsets of the state of the
universe support independent mental states?
These Problems are not necessarily of computation-
alism, but of classical computationalism under the as-
sumption of locality. These arguments do not necessarily
refute quantum computationalism, only the classical one
from Claim 2+. We obtained
Theorem 2. If mental processes are computational, then
they are are nonlocal.
Proof. Problems 2 and 3 show the necessity of nonlocality
for the existence of mental states.
But by admitting nonlocality, we reject classicality.
B. Biological brain version
There are several significant differences between how
the brain and how the computer work. The brain em-
ploys neural networks, but artificial neural networks can
be simulated on Turing-type computers. The brain seems
to be analog, but we can make the case that even if it is
analog, it can be approximated with a digital one to any
desired degree, because what matters is distinguishabil-
ity, which is not unlimited. In addition, Quantum Me-
chanics implies that a localized system like the brain can
only have a discrete, or even a finite number of distin-
guishable states, and this is true even if the brain’s rel-
evant functionality is quasi-classical. These arguments
support the idea that the functionality of the brain can
be simulated on a computer. And if we believe that only
the behavior matters, since the behavior of the mind can
be simulated, the mind should be like a Turing machine.
However, maybe not only the computational aspects of
the brain are relevant for the mental processes, but also
the fact that is biological, its material substrate. This is
what makes Claim 2+ to be stronger than Claim 2. So we
need to see if we can make the thought experiment from
§III A more general, by including the material substrate.
A possible way to adapt the cosmic computer thought
experiment is to try to divide the brain into the smallest
units for which the substrate is important. Maybe it is
possible to divide it into neurons, or maybe into smaller
parts of the neurons, which are made of the relevant sub-
strate. Then, it is conceivable that we can replace the
connections that allow signals to be exchanged between
these parts, and the parts whose substrate is irrelevant,
with other mechanisms that allow us to separate them
throughout the galaxy, in a way similar to the cosmic
computer thought experiment. But this requires an un-
derstanding of the brain that we do not currently have.
Another way, which will be used here, is to zoom-in, in
a way similar to Lebniz’s Mill argument. Leibniz imag-
ined zooming-in a brain until one can walk inside of it
and see its machinery like inside a mill [33]. Imagine
that we zoomed-in, so that the brain appears as large
as a galaxy. This would make its constitutive atoms of
planetary sizes. Now we can see the problem, it is similar
to the case of the cosmic computer thought experiment.
While we no longer have bits, we have instead the states
of the atoms, and their relative configurations. But the
states of the atom are discrete, and the possible ways
they combine into molecules are discrete too. So the
thought experiment is similar to the cosmic computer
one in its essential aspects, except that in addition one
assumes that the substrate is relevant too. In this case,
the substrate is provided by the atoms and their arrange-
ments, or even by the configurations of the electrons and
the nucleons composing the atoms. At this level where
atomic and molecular physics and chemistry become rel-
evant, Quantum Mechanics becomes relevant too. But
if we want to abide to Claim 2, we have to assume that
only the classical limit of the configurations of atoms and
molecules is relevant.
At this point, we can see that even if we assume that
the substrate is important for the mental states, this can-
not avoid the problems that arise if we assume locality.
In particular, this thought experiment reveals problems
similar to Problems 2 and 3, with the amendment that
instead of states of bits we are talking about classical
approximations of states of atoms and molecules.
Note that zooming-in to increase the apparent size of
the brain did not actually change the way it works. The
purpose of zooming-in was only to make clearer the prob-
lem introduced by locality and spacelike separation be-
tween the atoms. So the nonlocality of mental states is
manifest in the case of the biological brain too. Not the
classical computationalist Claim 2+ was the cause of the
problems, but the assumption of locality.
IV. CAN THE NONLOCALITY OF MENTAL
STATES BE QUANTUM?
In this section I discuss the possibility that the kind
of nonlocality revealed in Sections §II and §III may be of
quantum origin. This possibility is justified by the fact
that we do not know of other nonlocal physics than that
of quantum origin, see Corollary 2.
For reasons independent from Theorem 1, the idea that
Quantum Mechanics has something to do with conscious-
ness is nearly as old as QM itself, the main attractive
features being
1. the violation of determinism by the wavefunction
5collapse, considered by incompatibilists to be nec-
essary for free-will,
2. the apparent necessity of an observer, at least in
Standard QM (but see [52] for a version of Standard
QM without observers),
3. advantages of quantum computability over the clas-
sical one, by using superposition and entanglement.
Numerous proposals were made to connect the two, in
particular by London and Bauer [36], Heisenberg [28],
von Neumann [57], Wigner [59], Penrose and Hameroff
[26], Stapp [47, 48], and others [5].
The idea that quantum effects in the brain may be rel-
evant was criticized in [53] and [29, 32]. The decoherence
times in a “warm, wet and noisy” environment like the
brain was estimated to less than 10−21 seconds [53], but
a corrected version gave 10 − 100 microseconds, with a
possibility of going up to 10 − 100 miliseconds [24, 25].
Moreover, evidence for maintained quantum coherence in
a “warm, wet and noisy” environment was found later,
true, for photosynthesis [20, 39]. A simple “recoherence”
mechanisms able to maintain decoherence in an “open
and noisy” quantum system like the brain was found in
[27, 34]. Other quantum features, expected to be asso-
ciated to macroscopic quantum systems, were found in
microtubules in [45]. But the jury is still out.
The kind of nonlocality of the function Ψ from eq. (1),
required by Principle 1, is similar to quantum entangle-
ment, but there are also differences.
Nonrelativistic Quantum Mechanics is obtained from
a classical dynamical system by quantization. While the
state of the classical system is a point in its state space,
in the quantized theory it is a function defined on the
classical state space, so a function of the possible classi-
cal states. For example, if the classical system consists of
n (point-)particles, its state space is the phase space R6n,
whose points are (x,p) = (x1, . . . ,xn,p1 . . . ,pn), where
xj is the position of the j-th particle, and pj its momen-
tum. A quantum state is then represented by a real func-
tion W on the phase space R6n, called Wigner function
[6, 58]. But the more commonly used representation is as
a complex function ψ on the classical configuration space
R3n of all possible positions x of n particles. The quanti-
zation procedure also replaces the classical evolution law
with a quantum one, so the Hamilton equations satisfied
by the classical system are replaced with a Schro¨dinger
equation satisfied by ψ. The wavefunction ψ depends on
the position x, but it also depends implicitly on the mo-
mentum p, as we can see by applying the Fourier trans-
form.
Entanglement is due to the fact that ψ is a func-
tion of the positions of all particles, and it cannot be
seen as more functions of the position of each particle
ψ1(x1), . . . , ψn(xn), except in special cases.
The analogy between the function Ψ from eq. (1) and
ψ, or its Wigner transform W (ψ), is that both depend
on the arrangements of the particles in space. Let us
represent this analogy, admittedly quite vaguely,
Ψ (physical state) is like ψ (physical state) (2)
This analogy suggests a possible relation between the
nonlocality of the mental states, which we just inferred
from Theorem 1, and quantum nonlocality. But we
should be careful that there are some differences. First,
the argument of Ψ, physical state, represents a phys-
ical state in our world, which is quantum. This state is
not classical. Even if under the Claim 2 we assume it
to be quasi-classical, it is not the same as the classical
state which is the argument of the wavefunction ψ. How-
ever, it is considered plausible that the classical states
emerge approximately as a limit of the quantum states
in regimes where entanglement is almost absent and the
wavefunction ψ is concentrated mostly at a point x in
the configuration space.
There is also a difference in the values the two functions
Ψ and ψ can take. The values of ψ are complex numbers.
The real number |ψ(x)|2 represents “how much” of ψ is
concentrated at the point x in the configuration space.
When a measurement of the positions of all particles is
performed, this “how much” becomes4 the probability
that x represents the positions of the particles. On the
other hand, the value of Ψ is a mental state. But, if there
is a relation between the values of ψ and those of Ψ, I
have no idea what this relation may be.
In Quantum Mechanics, nonlocal correlations are made
possible by entanglement, but they become manifest only
through quantum measurements. In general we can not
directly observe the quantum state. We observe by mak-
ing quantum measurements, which involve a collapse of
the wavefunction, so at best we can learn the collapsed
state. On the other hand, for the mental states to affect
the objectively observable physical states, or to extract
information about these states, some mechanism is re-
quired. If eq. (2) reflects a true relation between the men-
tal states and the wavefunction, then one may speculate
that mental states affect the objectively observable phys-
ical states by the same wavefunction collapse. Maybe the
collapse of the wavefunction, which is postulated to ex-
plain both the outcomes of quantum measurements, and
the emergence of the classical world, is the way.
If quantum effects play a role in the brain is still an
open question, but they better play and important one,
because otherwise we will have to find other ways to sup-
port nonlocality. And it is difficult to find other ways,
because we will also have to make sure that these ways
do not allow faster than light or back in time signaling.
In Quantum Mechanics there are theorems that prevent
these kinds of signaling, so assuming that mental states
nonlocality is quantum seems a better choice than as-
suming additional physical laws.
4 This “metamorphosis” is one of the foundational problems of
Quantum Mechanics which various interpretations try to solve.
6V. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
Since the conclusion of Theorem 1 may seem too un-
believable even after the thought experiment from Sec.
§III, and since some of the other statements I made may
require to be detailed, I will now go into the details. I
raised myself these objections against my own argument,
and I will now give the answers I gave to myself. I hope
that by this I anticipate the most important objections
the reader may have, and address them convincingly.
A. Basic objections
Objection 1. The problem is that the argument starts
from Principle 1. Why is this assumption justified?
Reply 1. Principle 1 is simply the reductionist claim that
mental states are function of the physical states. It is
the minimal assumption about mental states, it does
not claim anything about their nature, only that they
are function of the physical states. Even if you are not
reductionist, even if you are dualist, you cannot deny
that mental states have physical correlates, so you can-
not deny Principle 1. And by this, according to Theorem
1, that mental states are nonlocal.
Objection 2. Are you claiming that mental states are
paranormal?
Reply 2. There is no paranormal assumption or claim
here. Theorem 1 is not a claim I made out of thin air, it
is simply the straightforward conclusion of the reduction-
ist Principle 1. It is not a claim, but a proof that men-
tal states are nonlocal, and I explained in what sense.
Like in the case of quantum nonlocality, the argument
itself does not imply that this nonlocality can be used
for faster-than-light signaling or back-in-time signaling.
When a mental state is reported by the subject, the re-
sulting message is encoded in a physical state. The phys-
ical system arrives in that state through interactions ac-
cording to the laws of physics. So nothing paranormal,
nothing supernatural is predicted to be observed.
B. Can locality be enforced?
In this subsection I will discuss some objections that
suggest ways to prevent nonlocality by enforcing locality.
Objection 3. I think an actual computer, especially if it
is supposed to simulate human-like brains, is more com-
plicated, and cannot be spread around the galaxy the way
you claim in §III A, a small number of bits on a separate
space station gravitating a different star.
Reply 3. It is known that the NAND gate is function-
ally complete, i.e. any logical circuit can be made of such
gates. You can realize a fully functional computer using
only NAND gates, like the one built by Kevin Horton
[31]. The NAND logical operation takes as input two
bits p and q, and outputs the negation of their conjunc-
tion, p · q (see Fig. 4).
p
q
p · q
p q p · q
0 0 1
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 0
FIG. 4. The NAND gate, which is an inverted AND gate.
Let us place a single NAND gate on a different space
station, orbiting a separate star. I will explain how this
can be done so that each space station stores two bits,
b1 and b2. Suppose the bits p and q come in sequence.
It does not matter which of them comes first, because
the operation p · q is commutative. We use the bit b1
to store the information that only one of the two bits
p and q is collected. So when b1 = 0, it means that
no bit was collected. As soon as one of the two bits p
and q, say bit p arrives, it is copied in b2, and we make
b1 = 1. When the bit q arrives, if b1 = 1, we send
both bits p and q through the NAND gate, and send
the resulting output, by using an electromagnetic signal,
to the next star in the circuit. Then we reset b1 to 0,
indicating that the setup is ready for the next logical
operation. If b1 = 0 when the bit q arrives, it means that
the bit p did not arrive yet, so we copy q in b2 and make
b1 = 1, then wait for p. Therefore, two-bit components
are sufficient. But we can go even deeper, considering
that each logical gate is made of several diodes, resistors,
and transistors5. They usually are part of integrated
circuits, but the computation is the same even if we place
these electronic components on separate space stations
around different stars.
We can, of course, use more bits to take care of the
exchanged signals, to send them, maybe to receive con-
firmation that they arrived, maybe to send them repeat-
edly to implement error correction etc, but it can be as-
sumed that this is not part of the computation itself.
But regardless of these details, the point is that it can
be arranged to that no space station does a computation
sufficiently complex to allow us to attribute it a human-
like mental state to that station alone. And let us not
ignore the fact that even the two bits b1 and b2 are very
close to each other on the space station, the simultaneous
events that they can support are spacelike separated.
Objection 4. Maybe a computer like in Reply 3 can-
not support local mental states. But such a computer
was considered with the purpose to be maximally spread-
able in space. What if we consider instead one that has
5 Diodes and transistors are quantum, but the logic gates can, in
principle be implemented using Classical Mechanics.
7components that are not so spreadable? Wouldn’t such a
computer be immune to the argument from §III A?
Reply 4. This would not help, and here is why. The point
of spreading the parts of the computer across the galaxy
was not to “destroy” its mental states, but to show that
they require nonlocality. It is not necessary to build it
out of NAND gates to show this. First, any computer
can be realized like this. Any computer is Turing equiva-
lent to one made solely out of NAND gates. Second, its
components are already spread in space. You can try to
miniaturize the computer how much you want, its parts
will still be spacelike separated. Spacelike separation
does not depend on the scale. No matter how close they
are in space, two simultaneous events are spacelike sepa-
rated. The thought experiment from §III A just empha-
sizes this separation, but it does not introduce it. So no
matter how complicated logical gates you will use, they
will always execute bit operations separated in space.
Objection 5. Before accepting the conclusion of Theo-
rem 1, I think we should try more and see if it is possible
to have a centralized, and therefore local, model of mental
states. As long as you did not exclude without a shred of
doubt this possibility, the conclusion of Theorem 1 is not
justified. You may ask, like Deckard, “What’s that gonna
prove?”, but as Tyrell replied, “indulge me” [21].
Reply 5. You have a good point, and I will do my best
to make the case for enforced locality, before replying.
Let us start by using a classical computer architecture
as a very rudimentary model of the brain, according to
Claims 1 and 2. I will use for reference the Harvard
architecture (see Fig. 5), rather than the von Neumann
architecture, because it appears to be more centralized.
FIG. 5. Harvard computer architecture.
Can we take the existence of a centralizing unit, the
control unit, as a model of true centralization? Har-
vard’s Mark I, the first computer to use this architecture,
weighed 4300 kg. Its sequence-control unit read a 24-bit
wide punched paper tape and followed the instructions to
operate the shafts. So it seems that even this one require
more than one bit, but maybe it does not require, it was
just practical to make it so.
Is it possible to have something like a central or control
unit, or whatever unit one may assume to be associated
to the mental states, that requires only one bit of mem-
ory? Given that a serial computer operates only one bit
for each clock cycle, we can take this bit as underlying the
mental state. This is an extreme claim, but let us pursue
this line of reasoning anyway. A one-bit unit supporting
mental states would eliminate the option of distributed,
decentralized storage of that unit by using more stars.
And we seem to be lucky with this one, because recently
researchers achieved presumably the most local way to
store a bit, by using a single atom [38]. They were us-
ing Holmium atoms, and they could store a bit, invert
it, and even store bits independently in Holmium atoms
placed at one nanometer apart, which makes this kind of
storage scalable.
In this way, we can try to build a model in which the
physical correlate underlying the mental state at a given
time is that particular single bit that is operated at that
particular instant of time. Whatever a serial computer
does, it does it as a sequence of one-bit binary operations.
The brain is different from a computer, in at least two
major ways. First, the brain does not seem to operate
logical gates, it is a neural network, one that can change
itself. But we can assume, based on the evidence support-
ing Claim 1, that such neural networks can be simulated
by digital computers, and indeed they can. The other
difference is that the brain operates in parallel. But par-
allel computing exists too, and it still requires a central
unit that breaks the task into smaller tasks, and then
centralizes the results. And that unit operates sequen-
tially, one-bit-at-a-time. Hence, we can still assume that
a one-bit-at-a-time model of the brain is not excluded.
We can therefore imagine that something like one-bit-
at-a-time processing can happen in the brain, as illus-
trated very schematically in Fig. 6. We do not have
evidence that this is the case, but it worth entertaining
this hypothesis, if the gain is the avoidance of nonlocal
mental states from Theorem 1.
FIG. 6. An attempt to make mental states local.
Let us now assume that each bit operated in this se-
quence is encoded into a precisely localized physical sys-
tem. True, Quantum Mechanics prevents it to be lo-
calized at a precise position. Apparently, Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle allows it to have a precise position,
but the price for this is a completely uncertain momen-
tum. This uncertainty of the momentum will make the
8immediately next position completely uncertain too. But
maybe our system can be made to collapse periodically
in a precise place. If we go that way, we invoke quan-
tum effects for merely storing a classical bit! And even if
our computer is classical, invoking quantum mechanical
collapse in order to obtained localized consciousness
1. violates Claim 2, by appealing to quantum effects
to allow the existence of mental states,
2. appeals to nonlocality, in an attempt to avoid it
(although not in the same sense as in Theorem 1).
So our bit has to be stored in a small region, but not a
precisely localized one. A Holmium atom in a relatively
stable state should do it. And we can be happy with the
situation, because such an atom is approximately local –
while the wavefunctions of its particles are concentrated
around the nucleus, they in fact extend in space to in-
finity! Since “approximately local” is not the same as
“local”, it is still nonlocal. Even if in practice there is no
way to probe this nonlocality, because our instruments
are also quantum and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle
kicks in, the fact that there is nonlocality is important as
a matter of principle.
But we can try to do even more, and assume an inter-
pretation of QM which allows point-particles – the Pilot-
Wave Theory. This way, the bit can be stored in one of
the well-localized point-electrons of the Holmium atom.
But the Pilot-Wave Theory is a paradigmatic example
of nonlocal theory [9]: the point-particles are guided by
the pilot-wave, in a way that depends on the positions of
other point-particles in a nonlocal way!
In addition, there is a severe limit of the amount of
information you can store and extract from a region of
space, the Bekenstein bound [7, 8, 11, 13]. And it turns
out that the information that you can store in a point
of space is basically zero. No matter how efficient you
go, suppose you can reduce the implementation of your
bits to the Plank scale, you will always need an extended
region of space to store even a single bit.
So it appears that we cannot get rid of nonlocality,
even if we assume that mental states are determined by
a single bit!
It is true, this nonlocality can be used to replace the
kind of nonlocality required by Theorem 1, but the price
is that we are limited to one-bit mental states only! And
what kind of mental state, what kind of experience re-
quires only one bit? Is our experience so simple, that
a single bit is enough to support or describe it? What
solution would be more crazy, that mental states are non-
local, or that they can be stored in an electron (in a still
nonlocal way)? Subjective empirical observations show
the following:
Observation 3 (Diversity of mental states). Our mental
states are complex and diverse, and there are definitely
more than two possible mental states.
Note that even if we take the position that the sub-
strate, the material of the brain, is essential to support
mental states, you still have to localize it at the level of
a single atom or a particle, and Quantum Mechanics still
does not allow true locality just like I explained above.
It remains a possible way out of the problem of diver-
sity of mental states: assume that mental states are as
diverse as needed, but they are not determined by a single
bit, or by the state of a single particle or even an atom,
but are determined by a sequence in time of the values
that bit can have. This may avoid nonlocality in space,
but it would still be a form of nonlocality, nonlocality in
time (also see Reply 11).
C. Objections related to time
Objection 6. I cannot accept your argument because
my philosophical position about time is eternalism (or
by contrary, presentism), which is in contradiction with
Observation 1.
Reply 6. Instantism is neutral to the dispute between
presentism (the position that only the present time ex-
ists, and the world changes in time) vs. eternalism (the
position that all instants of time are equally real and
immutable, but each instance of ourselves experiences its
own instant as the present). Instantism is consistent with
both of these positions, being simply a direct consequence
of the possibility to express the physical laws in terms of
dynamical systems, which is consistent with both presen-
tism and eternalism.
Moreover, a common argument raised by some presen-
tists against eternalism is that there can be no experience
of time in the block universe of eternalism. But instan-
tism shows that whatever explains our experience of time,
the explanation has to apply to each instant, so the same
reason why we can experience time in presentism has to
remain the same in eternalism as well. For details, see
Objection 7.
Objection 7. If Observation 1 is true and we can only
access our present state, then how is it even possible to
remember the past? How is it even possible to do Science?
Reply 7. Observation 1 is trivially correct, denying it
is out of discussion, but Objection 7 is nevertheless im-
portant. The problem that the present state can access
directly only itself is well-known and not specific to my
argument, but a general problem of physics. The expla-
nation is related to the arrow of time. The hypothesis
that the universe was in a very special, low-entropy state
(presumably at the Big Bang), sometimes called the Past
Hypothesis, explains the overall increase of entropy in one
direction of time (which by definition is called future),
and other time asymmetries. This hypothesis is required
by the understanding of Thermodynamics in terms of
Statistical Mechanics, and solves several problems. In
particular, it explains that we know much more about the
9past compared to the future because the present contains
records of past events. These records appear as patterns
in the macro states, and they would be ambiguous with-
out the Past Hypothesis, because we would not know to
interpret them as memories of the past events, and not of
future events or as mere statistical fluctuations. There
is plenty of literature addressing this problem of time
asymmetry and records convincingly, here is a selection
[2, 3, 12, 19, 22, 35, 40]. However, these problems are not
yet completely understood, and the things may be more
complicated than expected [51].
Objection 8. Even if assuming that mental states are
instantaneous implies that they are nonlocal, maybe men-
tal states are not instantaneous, they in fact seem to be
extended in time. This violates both Principle 1 and Ob-
servation 1, and therefore prevents you from reaching the
conclusion of Theorem 1.
Reply 8. From start, the claim that mental states are
not instantaneous may be at odds with Metaprinciple 1,
according to which the physical world is described by a
dynamical system. It is hard to see how denying this
Metaprinciple can allow someone to still hold a material-
ist, or even a physicalist position. But let us go this way,
for the sake of the argument, and suppose that mental
states can only exist extended in time, as in Fig. 7.
FIG. 7. If mental states are extended in time, then they are
nonlocal in time, in addition of being nonlocal in space.
Then, Eq. (1) should be replaced with an equation
that expresses a dependency of mental states of the phys-
ical states at different times, for example in an interval
[ti, ti+1] ⊂ R,
mental state(ti) = Ψ
(
physical state|[ti,ti+1]
)
(3)
Then, this would make mental states be local not only
in space, but also in time. To better understand this, it
may help to apply the thought experiment from Sec. III
to this argument of temporal extension of mental states.
D. Objections related to extension in space
Objection 9. Consider a chair in Classical Mechanics,
or any other rigid object extended in space, or even a soft
one like a brain. This does not make it nonlocal, so why
would mental states be nonlocal?
Reply 9. An extended object like a chair is made of parti-
cles that interact locally, and these interactions maintain
the chair’s configuration stable enough in time. There is
nothing nonlocal here, except our notion of rigid object
like a chair. Being extended in space is a nonlocal prop-
erty, but the laws of Classical Physics are local. If we
move the chair, we apply forces that propagate locally
within the chair, and make all of its parts move in an
apparently rigid way. If we sit on the chair, it supports
our weight again by local interaction between its atoms.
The chair exists as a unified simultaneous configuration
only in our minds. But apart from our mental state that
contains the chair, no other nonlocality is required for it
to exist as an approximately rigid object.
Objection 10. A classical computer is extended in
space, and is able to process information, independently
of our mental representations, contrary to the claims you
made in Reply 9.
Reply 10. In fact, this is a good example for Reply 9. A
classical computer is just a system that evolves in time
according to the laws of physics. Its discrete states are
physical states. They are seen as carrying information
only by us, the users of the computer. We interpret the
inputs and outputs as information, for the computer as
a physical system they are merely initial and final states.
We are the ones who interpret its time evolution as in-
formation processing. This computation seems objective,
and is objective, in the sense that different users will
agree that the same information processing takes place
in the same computer. But this kind of objectivity arises
from the fact that the underlying physical processes are
objectively the same for all of us, and from the fact that
we share the same conventions about the information
that goes in and out of the computer.
Objection 11. There are nonlocal physical quantities
even in local theories. For example, the total charge,
mass, energy, and momentum of a system depend on all
the constituents of the system, or on the values of its
fields at all points it occupies in space.
Reply 11. Indeed, local theories have nonlocal physical
properties, but they are still local, because their processes
can be fully described in terms of the local properties,
without ever mentioning the nonlocal ones. Similarly,
temperature is proportional to the average molecular ki-
netic energy over a large number of particles constituting
the gas or liquid or solid. And I concede that it is hard
to see how temperature, which is successfully explained
in a reductionist way in terms of Newtonian Mechanics,
is a sort of illusion. It is real, and since the average is
taken over a large volume, it is nonlocal. But in fact
its effects, in particular on the skin of a human being
who may feel burnt, or on the mercury rising in a ther-
mometer, are completely local effects. It is only in our
mind that these effects are integrated and unified. The
skin is really burnt, but this effect is local. The mer-
cury indicating the temperature rises in the thermome-
ter, but it happens through local interactions, and our
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consciousness integrates this information into the idea of
temperature. Mind only has indirect access to quantities
like total charge or temperature. But mind experiences
its own state, and this is where the difference becomes
relevant. In your examples as well as in my argument,
mental states are the nonlocal ones.
Objection 12. Can you explain the role of this nonlo-
cality in the mental states? Can you show where in the
brain nonlocality enters to produce the mental states?
Reply 12. Theorem 1 proves nonlocality, but not how it
works to yield the mental states, neither where to look
for it in the brain. This can be the objective of future
research. For the moment, it is important to know that
nonlocality is needed for mental states, but how and why
contributes to mental states remain to be investigated.
VI. ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS
In this section I discuss the possible alternatives to the
argument that mental states are nonlocal.
First, let us identify the possible alternatives to non-
locality by looking into the assumptions of Theorem 1
and of Corollary 1. Corollary 1 establishes that Claims
1 and 2 cannot both be true. Nonlocality goes with the
option of negating Claim 2, of classicality. If we want to
save classicality, or at least locality, maybe we can negate
Claim 1, of reductionism. But Theorem 1 does not as-
sume directly Claim 1, it assumes Principle 1, which,
while being a consequence of Claim 1, it can be true in
any approach to the mind-body problem which admits
a relation between the mental states and the physical
states. So in fact Corollary 1 can be strengthen to
Corollary 3. We have to choose between locality and the
existence of physical correlates for the mental states.
Proof. Principle 1 states that there is a correspondence
Ψ between physical and mental states, see eq. (1). But Ψ
is not necessarily a function of the form f : A→ B, since
it is probably not defined for all physical states, because
not all physical states appear to support mental states.
It is a partial function, because it is defined on a subset
of all possible physical states. Moreover, it is as well
hard to prove that Ψ is surjective, there may be mental
states without physical correspondent. But in all these
cases, Ψ is a relation, i.e. a subset of all the pairs of the
form (mental state, physical state), of the Cartesian
product between the set of all physical states and the set
of all mental states. Even in this general case, Principle
1 can be true, unless the relation Ψ is an empty subset of
this Cartesian product, or a small subset that makes the
relation between physical and mental states irrelevant.
But as long as there is a relevant relation, i.e. as long as
the physical state has something to say about the mental
state, Principle 1 is true and Theorem 1 can be applied,
with the consequence that nonlocality is required. So to
enforce the locality of the mental states, we have to make
them supported by one-bit or one-particle physical states,
which means to make the relation Ψ a small subset of the
Cartesian product, i.e. to reject the existence of such a
relation between physical and mental states.
Let us now consider the alternative options, without
claiming that we exhausted them.
Option 1 (deny Principle 1, instrumentalist version).
The role of Science is only to give an instrumentalist re-
duction of mental states to physical states, but not neces-
sarily an ontological reduction. Consequently, as long as
the claimed nonlocality of mental states does not lead to
faster-than-light or back-in-time signaling or other viola-
tions of the known physical laws, we should not even care
about the mental states, because they are not directly ob-
servable. One should only care about the physical states,
which are observable, and our language should not be con-
taminated by statements about mind, consciousness, etc.
Comment 1. The role and definition of Science may be
under debate. But if we assume that there is a reality,
and that our knowledge is entitled to seek explanations
about that reality, then a mere definition of Science as in-
strumentalism cannot make the questions go away. The
arguments in this article are directed towards the under-
standing of reality, which includes the mental states. So
whether, according to human-made definitions, the ques-
tions about mental states lie in the field of Science or of
Philosophy, these are questions about real things, and we
are allowed to ask them and to try to answer them.
Option 2 (deny Principle 1, illusionist version). There
are simply no mental states, period. This will do away
with the whole problem, because if there are no mental
states, there is no need for the function Ψ postulated in
Principle 1, such a function would make no sense at all.
Mental states are an illusion of some physical states ar-
ranged in the right configuration that corresponds to that
illusion.
Comment 2. I confess that I have no objective proof that
Option 2 is not available. But I also confess that I have
no idea what even means that there are no mental states,
or that they are illusions. Mental states may include
wrong or unreal impressions, illusions about who you are,
about your mental states themselves, but even if these are
illusions, there is an experience of these illusions.
At any rate, no matter how much I would try to con-
vince someone that I do have mental states, that person
can always say that the only things that exist are the
measurable things, the measurable properties of physical
systems. That person (a physical system for that mat-
ter) is free to deny the very existence of mental states,
because they are not directly measurable. While I can
report my mental states to other people, the very pro-
cess of reporting them means turning them into physical
means of communication (like sounds or written text),
resulting in physical processes, and it can always be said
that this is all there is.
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Option 3 (single-bit). The argument for nonlocality is
convincing, but we can avoid it by assuming that the phys-
ical states supporting mental states can only store a small
amount of information, like one bit.
Comment 3. I hope the discussion of the one-bit-mental-
states argument in §V B proved that if the physical sys-
tem supports only one bit, then
1. there can be only two possible mental states (that
maybe we can call on and off),
2. even so, quantum nonlocality will kick in, even if
at a very small scale.
Option 4 (deny Principle 1, dualist version). Maybe,
as the arguments from §V B say, one cannot enforce the
locality of mental states, if we assume Principle 1 to
be true. But a form of dualism allows this, by stat-
ing that Ψ cannot reflect a relation between the physi-
cal and the mental states, because the mental states are
independent of the physical ones. They can act on the
physical world through very localized inputs in the brain
though, in a local way consistent with the arguments from
§V B, but they are richer than what the atom or parti-
cle or bit through which the brain accepts them as in-
puts can support. Imagine a computer whose input is a
one-button keyboard, and you can input using the Morse
code. You can, in principle, input any text. So, if the
physical state from eq. (1) is just the input to the
brain, not the true physical correlate of the mental state,
rich mental states can exist and express themselves phys-
ically.
Comment 4. While this kind of dualism is in principle
possible, I personally think it is premature to accept it.
Other options allow us to know more about conscious-
ness, and their exploration is not yet exhausted. Accept-
ing this kind of dualism would mean to give up too early.
In addition, nonlocality is allowed by Quantum Mechan-
ics, the price being to give up Claim 2, which this kind of
dualism gives up anyway. I think this is a better deal. So
I cannot refute this option, but I find it unhelpful, and,
at least for the moment, undesirable.
Option 5 (single-bit temporal sequence). The physical
system underlying mental states contains only one bit a
time, but the value of the bit changes in time, and the
sequence of these bits is what underlies the mental states.
Comment 5. This option was discussed in §V B, and in
Objection 8, with the conclusion that this would still be
nonlocality, albeit nonlocality in time.
Option 6. There is a way to store and access as much
information as needed at a single point of space: holo-
morphic functions. A analytic or holomorphic function
is defined on an extended space, but its values, and the
values of its partial derivatives at each point of space,
can be used to determine the value of the function at any
other point, by using power series expansions around that
point.
Comment 6. This is mathematically true. In fact, in
[49] I argue that the fundamental laws of physics may be
holomorphic, and even discussed the possibility that the
ontology is not distributed in space or spacetime, but it
is all concentrated in a germ of the holomorphic field, or
an equivalence class of germs of the holomorphic field,
from which the fields can be recovered by power series
expansion and analytic continuation.
The problem with this option is that there is no known
way to access even the value, let alone the higher order
partial derivatives of the hypothetical field, and if this
would be possible, it could be used to violate faster-than-
light or back-in-time no-signaling. There is no known
mechanism other than quantum measurement to extract
even partial information from the germ. But, for this dis-
cussion, the most important aspect is that the germ of a
holomorphic field is essentially nonlocal anyway. So, even
if this Option would be true, we are back to nonlocality.
Option 7. Theorem 1 is correct, and mental states are
indeed nonlocal.
Comment 7. I think this is the right conclusion. But I
have no explanation for how this works, and no relevant
understanding of the consequences of this option. In Sec.
§IV I argued that there is a strong parallelism with quan-
tum nonlocality, but this does not answer the questions,
it merely provides a physical support for nonlocality.
VII. IMPLICATIONS
The purpose of this article was to ask a question and
to reveal a problem, which is that mental states have to
be nonlocal. Whatever its implications are, we will have
to learn more by studying this kind of nonlocality.
The first implication is related to quantum nonlocality.
Implication 1 (quantum in Biology). To avoid postulat-
ing new physics, it is reasonable to explore the possibil-
ity that Quantum Mechanics is important for the brain’s
functioning, and may be related to consciousness. This
was discussed in Sec. §IV.
Another implication is related to “objective measures”
of consciousness, defined for physical systems.
Implication 2 (Integrated Information Theory). In [55],
it was proposed that consciousness arises from integrated
information, which is measured by a function Φ (not the
same as Ψ or ψ). This is a measure of how much addi-
tional information a system has compared to its subsys-
tems, under certain conditions that are considered rel-
evant to distinguish consciousness from other forms of
information. The particular definition was criticized, for
example in [1].
But integrated information in itself is an abstract no-
tion, as long as it is not experienced subjectively, “from
within”. It is a property that we, conscious beings, at-
tribute to systems, based on how we assign information
to these systems. Theorem 1 shows that mental states are
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nonlocal, so there has to be a (likely) physical way to con-
nect the parts of the system, in order to really integrate
them. The implication is that integrated information, to
be associated to mental states, requires nonlocality.
Another implication is for the strong AI thesis, accord-
ing to which consciousness is purely computational, and
we can create it artificially, on classical computers.
Implication 3 (no classical strong AI). Since Claim 2+
is refuted by Theorem 1, and by the thought experiment
from §III A, consciousness cannot be reduced to classical
computation. Hence, it cannot be simulated classically,
and the strong AI thesis is refuted. But the possibility
to simulate it on quantum computers remains open.
Implication 4 (block-world mental states). Let us go back
to the thought experiment from Sec. III. Since mental
states are nonlocal, then they depend on the observer, be-
cause of the relativity of simultaneity. Two observers fly-
ing in different directions or with different velocities will
have different simultaneity spaces, and in each of them
the configurations of bits across the cosmic brain will be
different, so the associated mental states will be observer-
dependent. This is a problem. Indeed, by applying Ψ to
the succession of physical states as expressed in different
reference frames one expects to obtain distinct succes-
sions of mental states. This leads to the strange sugges-
tion that there have to be potentially infinitely many sub-
jective successions of mental states, one for each possible
reference frame. Of course, mental states are private,
only the reports made by the subject about her mental
states are objectively verifiable. And if a person reports
her own mental states to observers in different reference
frames, they will receive the same report, and will agree
about it. The private experience is of the person whose
brain is observed, and not of the other observers, but
the interpretation of the firings of neurons by different
observers lead to different successions of mental states.
One can consider that there is a preferred reference
frame, most naturally brain’s frame. But the thought
experiment in §III A, in which the space stations are in
relative motion with respect to one another, suggests that
there is no such frame. However, it is not inconceivable
that there is a preferred way to slice spacetime into three-
dimensional spaces, which is not manifest objectively.
Another option could be that the changes in the men-
tal states are slow enough so that in any reference frame
the story will appear essentially the same. This requires
that all changes of the mind state are in causal relation,
i.e. they are ordered so that each change is in the fu-
ture lightcone of any past change. This is the situation
from Reply 5, which leads to the nonlocality in time from
Reply 8.
Maybe there are infinitely many experiences, one for
each possible reference frame. Or maybe there is one
block-experience, a four-dimensional thing, and slicing it
in one reference frame or another yields a function like
Ψ which depends on time, but these are relative expe-
riences of the same four-dimensional block-world higher
experience, a situation which I cannot even imagine.
Truth is, while it is clear from Theorem 1 that mental
states are nonlocal, I do not have answers to this, or to
other problems that follow from this.
These are the immediate and more relevant implica-
tions of the nonlocality of mental states. The purpose of
this article was only to point out this kind of nonlocality,
but further research is required to refine our understand-
ing of both the nonlocality of mental states and processes,
and of its implications.
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